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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Paul Bairas, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
v. 
Lanard Johnson and Norman Cram, 
co-administrators of the estate of 
Philip G. Fulstow, deceased, 
Defendants-Respondents 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 9599 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries by the plaintiff, 
and personal injuries and property damage by the 
defendant, arising out of a one car accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Because of injuries sustained in the accident, plain-
tiff was unable to attend the jury trial setting of 
September 20, 1961. The court refused plaintiff's motion 
for a continuance and, since the plaintiff was unable to 
proceed, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint 
with prejudice and defendants' counterclaim without 
prejudice. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal or vacation of the judgment 
below and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about July 5, 1960, plaintiff, Paul Bairas, a 
resident of Los Angeles County, California, and Dr. 
Philip G. Fulstow of Kanab, Utah, were involved in 
a one car accident in Coconino County, Arizona, in 
which Dr. Fulstow was killed and plaintiff suffered a 
broken neck causing him to be paralyzed from about 
the neck down ( R. 7, 8, 18) . Plaintiff was removed 
to California where at the times pertinent hereto he 
was a ward of the County of Los Angeles, State of 
California, having no resources of his own ( R. 18, 41, 
110). 
Plaintiff Bairas filed this suit against the defendants, 
co-administrators of Dr. Fulstow's estate, on March 9, 
1961 (R. 3). In his complaint plaintiff alleged that 
Dr. Fulstow was operating the automobile at the time 
of the accident and further that the negligence, care-
lessness, recklessness and intoxication on the part of 
Fulstow caused the accident (R. 1-2). The defendants' 
answer and counterclaim was served on March 27, 1961. 
Defendants denied the essential allegations of the plain-
tiff's complaint and in their counterclaim alleged that 
plaintiff was the driver of the automobile and at fault 
(R. 7, 8). 
Fifteen days later the defendants applied to the 
court to set the case for trial ( R. 20) . Accordingly the 
case was set for June 14, 1961, but at the request of 
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counsel for the plaintiff that date was changed to June 
28, 1961, because the prior date conflicted with a 
planned trip of counsel ( R. 20, 21). 
A week before the date set for trial, counsel for the 
plaintiff informed the court that a motion for con-
tinuance on the ground that the plaintiff was unable 
to travel to Utah would be made ( R. 24) . This motion 
was supported by an affidavit of counsel for the plaintiff 
(R. 12) and an affidavit of Dr. C. H. Imes, a member 
of the medical staff of the Rancho Los Amigos Hospital 
in Los Angeles County for the treatment of paraplegic 
patients ( R. 18) . Defendants filed a four page affidavit 
in opposition to the motion for continuance, outlining 
their opposition to the motion ( R. 20-23). At the hear-
ing the defendants strongly opposed the granting of the 
motion for continuance unless it be agreed and ordered 
that there be no further continuances and that if the 
plaintiff should be unable to attend the next setting of 
the trial his deposition would be taken and used and 
further that the plaintiff would give defendants ten 
days notice of the taking of the deposition should it 
appear that plaintiff would be unable to attend (R. 27-
29). An order to this effect was signed by the court 
and served by defendants upon the plaintiff (R. 30). 
By this order which expressed that "the terms and con-
ditions were stipulated to by counsel for the Plaintiff 
in consideration for the court granting the instant con-
tinuance,'' the case was set for trial on September 20, 
1961. 
It appears from the affidavit of the plaintiff that 
six days before the September trial date he was informed 
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by the hospital doctors that he would not be able to 
travel to Utah for trial, although previous to this notifi-
cation plans and arrangements had been made for his 
travel to and stay in Utah for the trial (R. 109, 110). 
From the affidavit of Nathan Goller, plaintiff's Los 
Angeles attorney, it appears that when he contacted 
plaintiff on September 11, 1961, it was then intended 
and planned for plaintiff to travel to Utah for trial and 
that reservations on the Union Pacific Railroad had 
been made for that purpose ( R. 113) . At the time plain-
tiff was informed that he would not be allowed to 
travel to Utah he was also informed that a trans-uretha 
section operation had been scheduled for September 21 
in order that he might more comfortably and without 
attendance relieve his bladder (R. 110). It appears that 
plaintiff attempted immediately to contact Mr. Goller 
but that since he was paralyzed from the neck down 
and could neither write or phone he had to request 
others to do this for him ( R. 113 ) . He was first able 
to notify Mr. Goller of these unforseen and unexpected 
developments Sunday, September 17 (R. 110, 113). Mr. 
Goller attempted to obtain permission from the hospital 
for plaintiff's trip but was unsuccessful (R. 113). It 
was further shown by Mr. Goller's affidavit that he at 
all times until September 1 7 believed that the plaintiff 
\vould be able to travel to Utah for the trial of his 
case ( R. 114) . 
Mr. Goller notified the trial judge by wire September 
18 (R. 51). Affidavits of Dr. C. H. Imes of the hospital 
staff and Mr. Goller were executed September 18 and 
filed with the court September 20 (R. 42, 44~ 50). 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff's local counsel were notified by September 18 
and they notified, as quickly as possible, the court and 
defendants' counsel ( R. 100). When the case was called 
on September 20 plaintiff made an oral motion for a 
continuance based on the inability of the plaintiff to 
attend ( R. 61). 
Plaintiff also made a motion for a change of venue 
which had been served previously by mail (R. 34, 35) 
and in support thereof were filed an affidavit and a 
petition signed by twenty eight local residents (R. 32, 
36). 
Concerning the motion for contin·uance, the plaintiff 
argued inter alia, at the hearing on the 20th, that this 
was the first opportunity to bring the matter before 
court or defendants' counsel; that plaintiff was a welfare 
patient in a Los Angeles County hospital for paraplegics 
and as such was subject to the control of the hospital 
authorities; that unforseen circumstances arose very 
rapidly; that it was believed that the plaintiff would 
be able to attend trial on the date set until the Monday 
prior to the Wednesday on which the trial was set; that 
the agreement and order of the court of June 26 should 
not operate to deprive the plaintiff of a fair opportunity 
to try his case; that he is a material witness and that 
his presence is necessary to the proper conduct of his 
case; that it was impossible to comply in detail with 
the provisions of rule 6 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure because of the shortness of time and because 
affidavits from California did not arrive until the evening 
of the day prior to the trial setting; and that the June 26 
understanding and order should not prejudice the right of 
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the plaintiff to a fair trial in light of the unforseen and 
unexpected circumstances which arose (R. 55, 57, 59, 
66, 71). 
In opposition to the motion defendants argued that 
it was not timely filed and served and therefore could 
not be heard; that the order and agreement of June 26 
precluded consideration of a continuance and that the 
trial must go on; that plaintiff should have anticipated 
that he might not be able to be present for the trial 
of his case and should have been prepared by desposition; 
that the affidavits were not sufficiently specific; and 
defendants also incorporated all objections made at the 
time of the June 26 hearing (R. 53, 59, 67, 69, 70). 
The court denied the motion for continuance on the 
ground that "it is an oral motion, not having, of course, 
been served upon defendants as is contemplated and 
required under the Rules of Civil Procedure and it 
appearing to the court in this cause that the reasons 
set out for the continuance are not sufficient to justify 
a continuance at this time ... '' (R. 73). The motion 
for a change of venue was also denied (R. 73). 
Accordingly, the trial proceeded without the presence 
of the plaintiff, the jury being empaneled on the after-
noon of September 20 ( R. 79). Plaintiff's counsel 
attempted a proffer of proof as to what the plaintiff 
would testify to were he present ( R. 77, 78) and it 
appears that the court agreed to the preparation and 
filing of a written proffer of proof (see R. 78) which 
proffer was prepared and filed ( R. 124) . 
A later renewal of the motion for continuance was 
also denied by the court ( R. 82) . Plaintiff then attempted 
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to introduce into evidence in its entirety a discovery 
deposition taken by defendants of plaintiff at an earlier 
date (R. 86) but upon objection to this by defendants, 
the offer was \vithdra\vn and the deposition \vas not 
introduced in evidence in whole or in part (R. 87, 88). 
Plaintiff's counsel then indicated that they could go 
no further ( R. 91 ) whereupon the court dismissed plain-
tiff's complaint with prejudice and the defendants' coun-
terclaim without prejudice (R. 91). 
Plaintiff made a timely motion for a new trial based, 
inter alia, upon the denial of the motion for continuance 
and the denial of the motion for change of venue ( R. 
99-103 ) . At the time this motion was heard, the court 
had before it the affidavit of Paul Bairas, plaintiff, 
setting forth that he had believed he would have been 
able to attend the trial September 20 until notified to 
the contrary a few days prior thereto; that his condition 
was one of improvement; that transportation and attend-
ance arrangements had previously been made; that a 
week before trial he was notified that his condition 
would not allow him to go and that the hospital had 
scheduled a trans-uretha section for September 21, 1961, 
which would, if successful, allow him to release his 
bladder without the use of a catheter; that he had no 
resources of his own and was dependent for medical 
care and subsistence on the County of Los Angeles and 
therefore was under their control and jurisdiction; that 
he had been advised that he would be released in about 
four weeks and that the county would provide him with 
money for a medical attendant to assist him outside 
of the hospital but that so long as he was a full time 
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patient of the hospital they would not provide him 
with a full time assistant for travel away from the 
hospital (R. 109-111). 
In addition, the court also had before it two addi-
tional affidavits of Nathan Goller, plaintiff's Los Angeles 
counsel (R. 113, 117), an affidavit of Dr. Edward Bobo 
of the Rancho Los Amigos Hospital in Los Angeles 
County (R. 115), an affidavit of Dr .C. H. Imes, also 
of the Rancho Los Arnigos Hospital in Los Angeles 
County ( R. 119) and the written proffer of what the 
plaintiff would have testified to had he been able so 
to do (R. 124). 
The motion for a new trial was denied and an 
amended judgment was entered on October 26, 1961 
( R. 122, 128) . 
A total of seven months and seventeen days had 
elapsed since the filing of the complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, BOTH 
AT THE TIME OF THE TRIAL AND AT THE 
TIME OF THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, 
IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A 
CONTINUANCE WHICH WAS MADE ON THE 
GROUND THAT HIS SERIOUS ILLNESS AND 
PARALYSIS ARISING OUT OF THE ACCI-
DENT IN ISSUE PREVENTED HIS BEING IN 
ATTENDANCE AT TRIAL ON THE DATE SET. 
In order to fully understand the speed with which 
the plaintiff was denied his day in court, the material 
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prejudice arising therefrom and the reasons \vhy the 
continuance should have been granted, it may be of 
va luc to the court to review some of facts as they 
happened. 
rfhis case arose out of a one car accident. There 
is a dispute as to whether the plaintiff or Dr. Fulstow 
\vas the driver. In fact, all material points are in issue. 
Only the plaintiff and Dr. Fulstow were in the car at 
the time of the accident. Dr. Fulstow was killed. The 
plaintiffs neck was broken resulting in paralysis from 
about the neck down. Being without resources of his 
O\vn, he was made a ward of the County of Los Angeles 
in a hospital for paraplegics and he was subject to 
the control and jurisdiction of the hospital. 
This suit was filed on March 9, 1961. Defendants 
answer and counterclaim was served on March 27, 1961. 
Only fifteen days thereafter defendants applied to 
the court for a trial setting. Trial was first set for June 
14 but was reset for June 28 because the first date 
conflicted \vith a planned trip of plaintiff's counsel. 
Plaintiff had not been consulted concerning the first 
setting. 
Prior to June 28, plaintiff moved for a continuance 
on the ground that he was not then physically able 
to be present at his trial. Defendants vigorously opposed 
this continuance although only a few days more than 
three rnonths had elapsed since the filing of the com-
plaint and no pretrial procedure had been invoked. At 
this time it was the opinion of plaintiff's doctor that 
the plaintiff should be able to attend in about three 
months. 
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Over the defendants' vigorous objection the court 
granted a continuance to September 20, but at the 
insistence of defendants, and apparently as consideration 
for the continuance, the court required an agreement-
embodied in its "Order Continuing Trial Date" (R. 30) 
-to the effect that this would be the last continuance, 
that if plaintiff were not able to attend his deposition 
would be used, and, in addition, that if it were to appear 
that it would be necessary to use plaintiff's deposition 
that the defendants be given at least ten days notice 
of the taking of the deposition. 
Plaintiff, however, continued to show steady im-
provement and he and his Los Angeles counsel, Mr. 
Nathan Goller, made the necessary arrangements, in-
cluding train reservations, for his trip to Utah for the 
trial. 
Unexpectedly, on September 14, six days before the 
trial date, plaintiff was for the first time informed by 
the hospital that he could not attend the trial and 
further that his then condition required a trans-uretha 
section on September 21 for the purpose of enabling 
him to release his bladder without the use of a catheter 
and without the constant surveillance of attendants, and 
that this operation would, if successful, greatly facilitate 
his ability to travel. Because of his paralysis from the 
neck down, plaintiff was required to rely upon others 
to notify his counsel of this unexpected development. 
He was first able to notify Mr. Goller on September 1 7, 
and he, Mr. Goller, immediately attempted to get the 
hospital authorities to reverse their position and to allow 
the plaintiff to travel to Utah, but in this he \vas un-
10 
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successful. Mr. Goller immediately notified the court of 
this development. Counsel were notified as rapidly as 
possible. Affidavits stating the facts were prepared, 
forwarded to Utah, and an oral motion for a con-
tinuance was made in court on the morning of the 
20th. 
Defendants again vigorously opposed the granting 
of the motion, on the ground, inter alia, that it had 
not been timely filed. Defendants also insisted that the 
court's order of June 26 precluded any further contin-
uance and that the plaintiff should have been prepared 
for this type of unforseen development. Defendants in-
sisted that the trial proceed. This was six months and 
eleven days after the initial commencement of this suit. 
The trial court denied plaintiff's motion even though 
the affidavit of Dr. Imes of the Rancho Los Amigos 
Hospital showed that a trip at that time would seriously 
endanger plaintiff's life, but that the contemplated 
operation would greatly facilitate plaintiff's traveling to 
Utah, and that the plaintiff should be able to accomplish 
this travel in about five weeks \lvith the hospital furnish-
ing him needed assistance for this purpose ( R. 41 ) . 
Though the case had been at issue for less than six 
months, the requested short continuance was denied. 
Rule 40 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that "Upon motion of a party, the court may 
in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just 
... postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
sho\vn." Plaintiff recognizes the wholesome rule that 
the granting of a continuance is within the sound 
11 
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discretion of the trial court and that the court's action 
will be reviewed only where there is an abuse of this 
sound discretion. 
Plaintiff submits that this is a case meriting such 
review. Plaintiff recognizes that there are many cases 
which on their facts have held that failure to grant a 
continuance was not error. Plaintiff also recognizes that 
where, in fairness and in the furtherance of the ends 
of justice, a continuance should have been granted in 
a given case, the appellate courts have not hesitated 
to grant relief in order that a party may have his day 
in court. 
Plaintiff submits that this is a case meriting such 
review in order that the mandate contained in the 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11, that "All courts 
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to 
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay ... " and the further 
mandate contained in Rule 1 (a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure promulgated by this court, that "They 
shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action" shall 
not be mere hollow utterances honored more in the 
breach than in the observance. (Italics added) 
Surely the right to a just trial on the merits must 
take precedence over the right to a speedy disposition 
of a case not on the merits \vhich precludes a plaintiff 
paralyzed from the neck do,vn from ever having heard 
in a court of justice his cause which had then been 
but a fe,v days over six months on the docket. 
12 
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It has been recognnized in many cases that a party 
has a strong and substantial right to attend the trial 
of his own case in order to assist his council in its 
conduct (as well as be a material \vitness). He should 
not be denied this fundamental right for light and tran-
sient reasons or merely as a matter of convenience to 
court or counsel or as a matter of technicality, when 
to do so deprives him forever of the right to have his 
case heard on the merits. 
In Jaffe v. Lilienthal, 101 Cal. 175, 35 P. 636, 637 
( 1894) the court said 
It seldom happens that a trial can be properly 
had in the absence of the plaintiff, even where he 
is disqualified as a witness, especially where it is 
to be tried upon oral testimony. With all the care 
that can reasonably be taken by both attorney 
and client, some matter of vital importance is 
liable to be overlooked by them until the trial 
calls it to the recollection of the plaintiff, and this 
is especially true in relation to matters purely in 
rebuttal. It is the right of parties to be present 
at the trial of their causes. 
The recent case of Giorgetti v. Peccole, 69 Nev. 76, 
241 P. 2d 199 ( 1952), quoting the above with approval, 
held it an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance 
\vhere illness precluded a party's attendance. 
In the leading case of Borman v. Geib, 94 Okla. 270, 
221 P. 1006, 1007 ( 1924) the Oklahoma court held 
A party to the litigation is entitled to be present 
to assist in the conduct of the cause. Counsel is 
entitled to have his client present for many con-
siderations which need not be detailed here, but 
13 
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which are familiar to all courts and legal prac-
titioners. 
Other significant cases in support of this fair and 
fundamental rule are Westfall v. Motors Ins. Corp., 348 
P. 2d 784 (Mont. 1960); Anderson v. Chapman, 356 
P. 2d 1072 (Okla. 1960); Rausch v. Cozian, 86 Colo. 
389, 282 P. 251 (1929); Bernard's Fur Shop v. De Witt, 
Inc., 102 A2d 462 (Mun.Ct.App., Dist. Col. 1954); 
Norman v. McGraw, 299 P.2d 521 (Okla. 1956). 
The older Utah case of McGrath v. Tallent, 7 Utah 
256, 26 P. 574 ( 1891) cannot be considered as diminish-
ing that rule for the comments there concerning con-
tinuance are not essential to the disposition of the case 
for it was disposed of on other grounds. 
In any event, plaintiff was a material witness and 
thus would come within the rule stated, through dicta, in 
McGrath. Not only was a proper showing of the ma-
teriality of plaintiff's testimony made-we do not believe 
this point to be seriously questioned-but it should have 
been, and undoubtedly was, apparent to the court from 
the very nature of the case. Morehouse, v. Morehouse, 
136 Cal. 332, 68 P. 976 (1902). 
We recognize that where there is no chance for 
improvement the court may properly deny a continuance, 
in a proper case, rather than merely postpone the in-
evitable. But where there is a reasonable chance for 
improvement and attendance, as there was in this case, 
it has been almost universally held error to deny on this 
ground a motion for continuance. A recent case in point 
is Thanos v. Mitchell, 220 Md. 389, 152 A.2d 833 
( 1959). Despite dilatory delays for over two years the 
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court held it error to deny a continuance, pointing out, 
at page 834, that 
It appeared that Mrs. Thanos would be available 
within a reasonable time (a different situation 
would be presented if her illness were permanent 
or the prognosis was for a lengthy disability). As 
Judge Henderson said in Plank v. Summers [205 
Md. 598, 109 A.2d 914, 917] to have required 
the case to go to trial without her presence, would 
have been "like the play of Hamlet with Hamlet 
left out.'' 
Plaintiff finds no error in the many cases which hold 
~hat a continuance need not be granted, on the basis 
of illness, where there is no possibility of recovery suf-
ficient to allow attendance within a reasonable time. 
But that is not the instant case. The affidavits of the 
plaintiff and his doctors show continual improvement, 
interrupted once temporarily, but eventually hastening 
recovery, by the situation which prevented his appearance 
at the September trial date. It would be indeed most 
unjust and restrictive to the point of being a denial of 
due process if the procedural rules were to deprive the 
plaintiff of an opportunity to show this court, or a 
trial court, as the case might be, that in fact the belief 
of himself and others that his rate of recovery would 
have allowed attendance in about five weeks was not 
only bona fide but also accurate. The plaintiff would 
'velcome an opportunity to show the truth of the above 
statement and that he is, and for some time has been 
-as was presented to the trial court would be the 
case-able, ready and willing to travel to Utah for the 
trial of his case. 
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rfhere had been no undue delay in the prosecution 
of this case; on the other hand, there was a most con-
certed effort on the part of defendants to avoid a trial 
on the merits, an effort which, it might be said, went 
to the extreme of taking an unfair advantage of plain-
tiff's helpless condition at a time when about five more 
\Veeks would have allowed a fair trial on the merits. 
At the risk of being repetitive, plaintiff would again 
point out to the court that this case was filed on 
March 9, 1961 and ended by the denial of plaintiff's 
motion on September 21, a period of only six months 
and twelve days. Had the reasonable continuance re-
quested been granted, the matter could have been heard 
on its merits in about eight months or less from the 
date the complaint was first filed. It may be noted that 
except for the factors arising in a wrongful death action 
or a claim against an estate, the plaintiff would have 
had, in a normal situation, until the middle of 1964 
in which to have filed his suit-and the defendants would 
not have been heard to complain. 
No case has been found, similar to the present case 
on its facts, wherein speed has been held so much more 
important than a just trial on the merits that a denial 
of a continuance has been affirmed. This fundamental 
principal of Anglo-American due process and fair play 
is quite well summed up in a few words in Borman v. 
Geib, 94 Okla. 270, 221 P. 1006, 1007 ( 1924) where 
the court said 
The showing made disclosed that the plaintiff 
could be present within a reasonable time. Justice 
does not demand that a trial should be so hurried 
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that a plaintiff who is absent on account of illness 
is deprived of the right to be present. 
There are many cases which have held, despite great 
delays, prior continuances, dilatory tactics and other 
misconduct that a denial of a continuance where a party 
was ill was error. Despite many apparently prior delays 
on flimsy excuses, the court held in Anderson v. Chapman, 
356 P.2d 1072 (Okla. 1960) that a refusal of a con-
tinuance requested because of party's illness was re-
versible error. In that case the period of total delay 
\vas sixteen months. Where a fair trial on the merits 
will be facilitated thereby, a continuance should be 
granted on the basis of a party's illness, despite prior 
continuances and delays. Morehouse v. Morehouse, 136 
Cal. 332, 68 P. 976 (1902) several prior continuances; 
Pierce v. Merchants Heat & Light Co., 189 Ind. 571, 
127 N.E. 765, 128 N.E. 598 ( 1920) much procrastination 
and delay; Overstreet v. Citizens' Union Nat. Bank, 256 
Ky. 653, 76 S.W.2d 641 (1934) attorney-party guilty 
of dilatory tactics prior to illness; Ex parte Driver, 258 
Ala. 233, 62 So.2d 241 ( 1952) two prior continuances. 
Some cases have turned on the question of whether 
the alleged illness did in fact prevent attendance or was 
merely advanced as an excuse. Defendants have not seen 
fit to question the fact of illness, or incapacity, in this 
case, nor is that point seriously in issue. Defendants have 
asserted, however, that the agreement and order of June 
26 precluded a further continuance regardless of the 
question of good faith or when the plaintiff first learned 
that the hospital would not allow him to attend the trial. 
Plaintiff submits, however, that the agreement and order 
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must be read as a whole and that the third portion-
which would be superfluous if it did not have this effect 
-shows that the order was not an absolute do or die 
matter, but that it was reasonably and in good faith 
interpreted by plaintiff and his counsel not to preclude 
a request for a further continuance if the plaintiff, un-
expectedly, were unable to attend the trial from matters 
arising to late to give the required ten days notice for 
the taking of his deposition. 
'"fhis provision which was inserted at the insistence 
of defendants and apparently prepared in its final form 
by defendants should not be held to make a game of 
Russian Roulette out of our trial procedure and to 
deprive a plaintiff of his day in court because of the 
sudden arising of an unexpected impediment to his 
attendance and participation at trial. If however this 
court should feel that such was the intention of the 
court's order of June 26, it is submitted that this court, 
in the exercise of its equitable supervisory powers over 
the administration of justice in this state can and should 
act to relieve plaintiff from the harshness of the bargain 
exacted as the quid pro quo for the first continuanc~ 
requested because of his illness. Such action by this court 
would serve to make the order of June 26, authorized 
by U. R. C. P. 40(b) just rather than an unjust order. 
Such action would also be consistent with the letter and 
the spirit of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
Defendants also asserted at trial that the plaintiff 
should not have his continuance because he should have 
been prepared for such an eventuality as did occur and 
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have available plainntiff's deposition. Under other cir-
cumstancess this might be a wholesome rule. Such 
circumstances would be where there was little chance 
for ultimate recovery, where there had been several 
prior delays, where there had been long prior delays 
or where the plaintiff had not been acting in good faith. 
While there are many cases which could be indiscrimin-
ately cited for the proposition that a party will not be 
granted a continuance where he could have taken his 
deposition, such cases do not bear scrutiny on this point. 
Approximately forty of these cases are collected at 68 
A.L.R.2d 470, 482. As is always the case when using 
secondary sources, the cases cited must be examined with 
caution. Almost all of them have been examined and 
in those instances where a denial of a continuance based 
on illness of a party has been upheld there have been, 
almost invariably, other substantial and good reasons, 
completely independent of the deposition question, to 
merit the denial. In some there were very lengthy prior 
delays; in some the assertion of illness was clearly a 
fabrication; in some the ill party had no prospect of 
recovery; some suggested that there was no showing 
of materiality to the party's testimony; in others the 
party's testimony was available from a prior trial of 
the same case; in some there is obvious bad faith; and 
in some the opinion is so truncated and devoid of essential 
facts as to be meaningless as a judicial pronouncement. 
The better reasoned cases however which are similar 
in background to the instant case hold it error to require 
a party-witness to submit to a trial by deposition where 
a showing is made that a reasonable further delay would 
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allow him to attend and to testify in person. For example, 
in Sampley v. Sampley, 166 S.W.2nd 208 (Tex.Civ.App. 
194 2 ) the court said, at page 209, 
The appellee's sole answer to the application 
for continuance, on the merits, was that he, 
through his counsel following the first continuance, 
offered to aid appellant's counsel in procuring her 
deposition by waiving time, commission, etc., so 
that she might in that way get her testimony into 
the cause before another trial; but it is this court's 
conclusion that she was not compelled-at her 
peril-to content herself with a deposition in 
advance of and in anticipation of being unable 
to appear at some future date. . . 
Of similar import are Stoneberger v. Bishkin, 236 
S.W. 782 (Tex.Civ.App. 1922); Low, Hudson & Gray 
Water Co. v. Hickson, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 457, 74 S.W. 
781 ( 1903). See also Plank v. Summers, 205 Md. 598, 
109 A.2d 914, 917 ( 1954). 
In some cases prejudice to the opposing side has 
been a factor considered. The record in this case is 
devoid of any evidence to suggest that the defendants 
would be prejudiced or even materially inconvienced by 
the granting of the requested postponement. At the June 
26 hearing reference by affidavit was made to the desire 
to close the estate to avoid tax penalties and that the 
heirs were suffering anxiety, solicitude and concern over 
the litigation and that the settlement of the claims of 
general creditors was being delayed. However no facts 
in support of these broad, general, sweeping conclusions 
were adduced at that time, nor has this ground been 
seriously interposed since or substantiated. It is un-
fortunate that litigation cannot be conducted without 
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some inconvenience-but such seems to be the nature of 
the thing and it is respectfully submitted that in order 
to justify depriving a party of a chance to prove the 
merits of his claim the inconvenience that would deprive 
a man forever of his day in court must be indeed more 
than mere conjecture. Any inconvenience caused by the 
short requested delay would have been microscopically 
infinitesimal compared to the enormity and gravity of 
the loss to the plaintiff. 
The facts and showings concerning the reason for 
plaintiffs requested continuance were all before the trial 
court at the time the motion was denied on September 
20. They were still before the court, and amplified and 
buttressed by additional affidavits at the time of the 
hearing on the motion for a new trial. At either point 
the trial court could have, and should have, granted 
the continuance. The arguments made herein are appli-
cable to either point of time. 
It is respectfully submitted that under the circum-
stances of this case it was material prejudicial error-
an abuse of the trial court's sound discretion-to deny 
plaintiff's requested continuance and that accordingly 
the judgment below should be reversed or vacated and 
a new trial granted. 
POINT 2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENY-
ING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A CHANGE 
OF VENUE. 
Utah Code Anno. 1953, 78-13-9 provides: 
The court may, on motion, change the place of 
trial in the following cases: 
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( 2) When there is reason to believe that an 
impartial trial cannot be had in the county, city, 
or precinct designated in the complaint. 
Plaintiff moved the court for a change of venue on 
the ground that local prejudice would preclude his ob-
taining a fair trial in the county where set. In support 
thereof plaintiff provided the court with an affidavit 
of Larry Reeves and a petition signed by twenty-eight 
persons all to the effect that there was such bias and 
prejudice in Kane County as to make it impossible for 
plaintiff to have a fair jury trial there. Despite this 
showing of bias and prejudice the motion was denied. 
Through the case of Anderson v. johnson, 1 Utah 2d 
400, 268 P.2d 427 ( 1954) affirmed a change of venue, 
it sets forth the rule that "all laws that have to do with 
the removal of action from one local jurisdiction to 
another for trial have one definite purpose, that is to 
promote justice by avoiding local matters of a prejudicial 
nature that might be detrimental to the rights of one 
of the parties." 
The plaintiff in this case is entitled to his day in 
court and also to a day in court where an unbiased 
jury may be had. 
Though the case did not get to the jury, it was 
nonetheless error not to grant the motion for a change 
of venue. In a subsequent trial the plaintiff should be 
afforded a trial in a county where an unbiased jury may 
be assured. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff submits that the record before this 
court shows that the trial court abused its sound dis-
cretion in failing to grant plaintiff's motion for a con-
tinuance and in failing to grant plaintiff's motion for 
a change of venue. 
Plaintiff prays that this court reverse or vacate the 
judgment of the lower court and remand this case for 
a trial on the merits in a county free from bias and 
prejudice, and in any event that it be reversed for a 
trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gardner & Burns 
25 East Lincoln Avenue 
Cedar City, Utah 
Nathan Goller 
9171 Wilshire Blvd. 
Beverly Hills, California 
Attorneys for the Appellant 
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